A
LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRIVATIZATION OF SOCIAL
SECURITY
KARL
J. BORDEN
Professor
of Financial Economics
University of Nebraska
CHARLES
E. ROUNDS, JR.
Professor
of Law
Suffolk University Law School
OVERVIEW
Gradually,
we are coalescing around an understanding that the nation's retirement
system needs an overhaul. Social Security, as it is currently
structured, creates no property rights and builds no pool of national
wealth. It is, rather, a combined taxation scheme and welfare
scheme, with the taxation and welfare elements of the system largely
unrelated to each other. Given the Ponzi-like nature of the system,
it is probable that sooner or later Social Security will be transformed
into an investment-based system, citizens will enjoy property
rights to their own accounts, and real wealth will accumulate
to the benefit of all levels of our society. But what form will
a privatized social security system take? Will the legal and regulatory
structure that sustains a system of individual accounts look,
for instance, more like the one that supports 401(k) Plans, or
more like that which supports IRA's?
These
questions, and others like them, are beginning to be asked. The
focus of the debate, in fact, is very likely about to shift: away
from questions of whether and when to discussions of how and how
much. What is to be the legal, regulatory, and operational framework
of a national investment-based Social Security system? Just how
will funds flow from individuals into the system, who will run
it, which government entities and private-sector institutions
will be involved and how will they interact, to what extent will
funds be taxed, who will write and enforce regulations, and what
will be the legal and operational details of the system?
Getting
from here to there will mean treading a perilous path through
armies of accountants and attorneys who are going to try to regulate
the new system into oblivion. What is more, the manner in which
the basic law is framed constitutionally and the fundamental structure
of the system that is created will be critical to its success
or failure. It is time, we believe, to start paying attention
to some of the details of the plan that is likely to emerge from
the political process ahead of us.
In
this paper we frame the broad outlines of an investment-based
Social Security program that in our opinion best addresses, balances,
and harmonizes the desire of the libertarian that there be reduced
state regulation and the desire of the statist that government
have a role in mitigating risks associated with market forces
and human behavior. We start with a fundamental question:
What is the constitutional basis for an investment-based Social
Security system? The core of our proposal is something we call
the Private Retirement Account or PRA. The reader will see that
the PRA is closer to the IRA model than the 401k model. We then
propose a fundamental regulatory structure that is designed to
protect the system, minimize costs and maximize flexibility and
innovation. Finally, we address several specific system elements
that are critical to operational success: start-up funds-flow
procedures, limits on investment discretion, marriage-and-divorce
provisions, hold harmless status and the age of retirement,
taxation of contributions and disbursements, and assignability
and spendthrift provisions.
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the entire study in PDF format
©2002
Beacon Hill Institute for Public Policy Research at Suffolk University